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We examine two related questions: (a) are individual dif-
ferences in foreign policy preferences at tributable, at least
in part, to genetic variation and if so, (b) do political ide-
ology and attitudes towards foreign policy share a
common genetic etiology? Existing studies have focused
either on the heritability of individual political attitudes
related to specific foreign policies and preferences, or the
extent to which foreign policy preferences are predicted by
political attitudes. We extend these two lines of research by
addressing whether a general hawkish or dovish prefer-
ence is heritable and whether the same genes that account
for individual differences in foreign policy preferences are
shared with political ideology. Understanding the heri-
tability of foreign policy preferences and their genetic
commonalities with ideology is a critical precursor to
establishing and testing theories about the causal
processes, both direct and indirect, that affect preferences
over foreign policy. 
The foreign policy preferences of the mass public have
traditionally been studied in association with political atti-
tudes: principally party identification and political
ideology, but also demographic characteristics such as
gender, education, and generation (Holsti, 2004). The lit-
erature on foreign policy preferences can be characterized
by a relatively stable set of findings on the relationship be -
tween demographics and preferences, and a debate over
whether party or ideology is the primary determinant of
nondemographic variance in foreign policy preferences.
Consider first, the stable demographic effects. Perhaps the
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most consistent finding in this literature is that men are
substan tially more likely to approve of the use of force
abroad than women (Berinsky, 2009; Eichenberg, 2003;
Nincic & Nincic, 2002). Though based almost exclusively
on the analysis of opinion within the United States, this
finding has been replicated in analyses of support for
World War II (Berinsky, 2009), the Korean War
(Modigliani, 1972; Mueller, 1973), the Vietnam War
(Mueller, 1973; Verba et al., 1967), the Gulf War (Conover
& Sapiro, 1993), and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
(Berinsky, 2009). There is also reason to think that,
because attitudes towards foreign policy are likely linked
to world events that occur proximate to the formation of
preferences, there may be generational effects in foreign
policy preferences (Holmes, 1985; Holsti, 2004; Klingberg,
1952, 1983). Lastly, there is evidence to suggest that higher
levels of education are associated with greater support for
internationalism generally and cooperative foreign poli-
cies specifically (Holsti, 2004; Wittkopf, 1990, 1995).
Interestingly, race effects have been difficult to parse out
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because race covaries strongly with socioeconomic status,
education, party, and ideology (Holsti, 2004; Nincic &
Nincic, 2002). 
Existing knowledge on the nondemographic predictors
of foreign policy preferences is consid erably more varied.
Although there is evidence to suggest that attitudes
towards specific foreign policies, particularly armed
conflicts, are affected by events (Larson, 1996) and costs
(Gartner & Segura, 1998; Gartner & Segura, 2000), a con-
sensus has emerged in the literature that individuals have
reasonably well-specified attitudes towards foreign policy
in general (Berinsky, 2009; Feaver & Gelpi, 2004; Gelpi,
Feaver, & Reifler, 2005; Holsti, 1992, 2004; Hurwitz &
Peffley, 1987; Jentleson, 1992; Nincic, 1988; Page &
Shapiro, 1992). This suggests that the study of foreign
policy attitudes that are not linked to particular issues may
be more fruitful than studying approval of particular poli-
cies, because these more general attitudes underlie
approval for specific policies and are then moderated by
the particulars associated with those policies. 
When considering the general foreign policy attitudes
of citizens, the two respondent character istics that consis-
tently garner the most attention are party identification
and (self-reported) political ideology. The literature exam-
ining parties’ (correlational) association with foreign
policy prefer ences indicates, if anything, that the degree of
association varies greatly over time: policy attitudes up to
(and mostly including) the Vietnam era were marked by a
lack of partisan cleavage that be came highly polarized
during the Reagan years and then seems to have relaxed
again (Holsti, 2004). The literature on the effect of ideol-
ogy is more consistent. Wittkopf (1990, 1995) finds that
liberals have a greater tendency to support cooperative
foreign policies and oppose military internationalism.
Conversely, conservatives tend to support military inter-
nationalism and oppose cooperative internationalism.
Furthermore, evidence from multiple surveys seems to
indicate that the effects of ideology dominate those of par-
tisanship (Holsti, 1992, 2004; Wittkopf, 1990, 1995). 
Though the finding that political ideology drives
foreign policy preferences is based on correla tional rather
than causal studies, a causal link exists in theory because
voters are likely to support the party most in line with
their ideology (Downs, 1957). Both ideology and partisan-
ship are believed to be transmitted to children from their
parents at an early age (Campbell, Converse, Miller, &
Stokes, 1960). As such, it is difficult for empirical studies
based on surveys to parse out the two effects. This, in turn,
begs the question of where ideologies come from. Martin
et al. (1986) demonstrated that genetic variation accounts
for a moderate share of individual differences in political
attitudes and overall liberalism–conservatism. Numerous
studies using a variety of methods, including twins reared
apart and extended kinships, confirmed and expanded
upon these earlier findings (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing,
2005; Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, & Tellegen, 1990;
Eaves, Eysenck, & Martin, 1989; Eaves et al., 1999; Hatemi
et al., 2010; Lykken, Bouchard, McGue, & Tellegen, 1990).
Recent studies have also demonstrated that environmental
factors such as the important life events in dividuals expe-
rience (Hatemi, 2010) and the characteristics of one’s
social network (Settle, Dawes, Christakis, & Fowler, 2010)
interact with genetic endowments to shape political atti-
tudes. One study have also argued that genetics can play a
role in individual tendencies to commit acts of political
violence (Hatemi & McDermott, 2011). 
The studies considered above suggest that political ide-
ology is heritable and that there is a significant phenotypic
association between ideology and foreign policy prefer-
ences. However, no studies have yet addressed the
possibility that general foreign policy attitudes are them-
selves heritable, or whether shared genetic factors underlie
the correlation between ideology and foreign policy pref-
erences. Exploring these associations can lay the
foundation for theoretical and empirical work on the
causal mechanisms and pathways by which genes explain
both attitudes and how the attitudes affect each other. Our
hypotheses are twofold. First, we hypothesize that, for
both foreign policy preferences and political ideology,
familial aggregation is best explained by genes and envi-
ronmental factors. Second, we hypothesize that the
observed phenotypic association between the two vari-
ables is therefore best explained by a combination of
shared genes and envi ronmental factors. Given the corre-
lational nature of the existing literature and of our
hypotheses, a correlated liability model is a natural choice:
we apply a bivariate ACE model with a Cholesky decom-
position to test the extent to which the observed
covariance between phenotypes (foreign pol icy prefer-
ences and ideology) can be explained by correlated
(genetic and environmental) liabilities. Alternative model-
ing approaches, such as an ideology mediation model
(Baron & Kenny, 1986) or a direction of causation model
(Duffy & Martin, 1994; Verhulst et al., 2011), are possible,
but existing results do not provide a sufficiently strong
theoretical basis for applying such models. The only alter-
native model we examine is a sex limitation model, which
we consider because of the strong sex-based differences
survey research has found with respect to foreign policy
preferences. 
Methods and Results 
Sample 
Our analysis is based on a sample of 1,192 twins in com-
plete matched pairs. To avoid potential response bias, we
restrict the sample to complete twin pairs, though quartile
comparison and t-tests suggest there are no statistically
significant differences between complete and incomplete
twin pairs. The original sample, which included matched
and unmatched twins, consisted of 1,349 subjects. For our
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final sample, which we use for all analyses, we restricted
ourselves to the 551 complete twin pairs that answered all
questions of interest to us (described below). This group
consists of 201 female monozygotic (MZ), 130 male MZ,
80 male DZ, and 140 female dizygotic (DZ) pairs. All
twins are members of the Minnesota Twin Family Registry
(Krueger & Johnson, 2002; Lykken et al., 1990) and the
data we use were generated by a single wave online survey
on political attitudes conducted in 2008 and 2009; the
ascertainment rate was 61%. A small number of subjects,
240 in total, with limited internet access took the survey
on paper. Quartile comparison and t-tests suggest there
are no significant differences between the subjects who
took the survey online and those who did not, with the
exception of small but noticeable differences on the dove–
hawk question discussed below. All twins surveyed were
middle aged, between 53 and 61. There are certain
benefits, however, to this restricted age range. First, there is
reason to believe that preferences and attitudes become
more stable later in life (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989). Second,
as mentioned above, a substantial literature indicates that
there are likely to be generational effects on foreign policy
attitudes (Holmes, 1985; Holsti, 2004; Klingberg, 1952,
1983), and the restriction of this sample to a single genera-
tion eliminates our need to control for this factor. For
more details on the sample, see the sample description in
Smith et al. (2012). 
Measures 
We rely principally on three measures for our analysis: two
measures of foreign policy preferences and one measure of
political ideology. We use these different measures because
foreign policy pref erences are difficult to measure and
several analyses with measures that capture somewhat dif-
ferent attitudes will provide us with a better
understanding of the robustness of effects under study.
Although additional measures of foreign policy prefer-
ences and political ideology would be ideal, the only valid
measures contained in the data are those we use.
Our first measure of foreign policy preferences captures
how dovish (conciliatory) or hawkish (aggressive) a
respondent self-reports their attitude towards foreign
policy to be. This measure is designed to capture prefer-
ences for conciliatory or militaristic internationalism. The
preference is coded on a seven-point scale that is a
response to the following question: “Some people believe
that the United States should solve international problems
by using diplomacy and other forms of international pres-
sure and use military force only if absolutely necessary
(Position 0). Others believe diplomacy and pressure often
fail and the U.S. must be ready to use military force
(Position 6). Where would you place yourself on this
scale?” As can be seen in Table 1, the mean is slightly
higher among MZ twins (2.103) than among DZ twins
(1.890), with similar standard errors. 
Our secondary measure of foreign policy attitudes is a
three-category reaction (agree, uncertain, or disagree) to
the statement that spending for the U.S. military should be
increased. This measure is related to the dove–hawk
measure (r = .454), but should also capture a somewhat
different effect. Because military spending does not neces-
sarily translate into a foreign policy based on military
internationalism, it is possible that some subjects may
prefer a strong defensive posture (and thus high levels of
military spending) and an isolationist foreign policy. As
such, we expect results based on this outcome variable to
complement the dove–hawk measure (which captures
cooperative and militaristic preferences more directly),
without being redundant. 
Our measure of ideology is a seven-point scale of self-
reported political views (extremely liberal, liberal, slightly
liberal, moderate/middle of the road, slightly conservative,
conservative, ex tremely conservative). As can be seen in Table
2, this measure is positively and significantly correlated with
the dove–hawk measure of foreign policy preferences for
both MZ and DZ twins, but the cross-twin, cross-trait cor-
relations are higher for MZ twins (r = .385 and r = .323)
than for DZ twins (r = .114 and r = .131). This indicates
that, as ideology becomes more conservative, for eign policy
preferences become more hawkish. Ideology also correlates
strongly with the military spending measure and the corre-
lations are higher for MZ (r =0.333 and 0.253) than for DZ
twins (.180 and .173). The correlation indicates that, as ide-
ology becomes more conservative, subjects agree more with
increases in military spending. 
Univariate ACE Model 
The first question our analysis must address is whether or
not there is evidence to suggest that foreign policy prefer-
ences are heritable. We use a univariate ACE model to
partition the variance compo nents in each measure into
those attributable to additive genetic effects (A), common
environmental effects (C), and unique environmental
effects (E). All estimation was performed via maximum
likelihood in Mx (Neale, Boker, Xie, & Maes, 2003).
Details on the statistical procedure can be found in Neale
and Cardon (1992) and Medland and Hatemi (2009).
Because all of our variables are ordinal, we estimate a
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for Foreign Policy Preference and Ideology
Measures
                                MZ Mean              MZ SD               DZ Mean            DZ SD
Dove–Hawk                 2.103                   1.890                   1.925               1.851
Military spending        0.801                   0.756                   0.836               0.776
Ideology                      3.272                   1.453                   3.300               1.467
Note: SD = standard deviation. The sample is comprised of 331 monozygotic
(MZ) and 200 dizygotic (DZ) complete twin pairs.
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threshold model. In order to test whether the estimated
variance components are statistically different for males
and females, we estimate a sex-limitation model and
compare the model fit to a pooled model in which the
variance components are constrained to be equal for
males and females. We allow men and women to have dif-
ferent thresholds in both the pooled and sex limitation
models. The fit statistics, reported in Table 3, suggest that
the pooled model is more appropriate in all cases. 
The results, displayed in Table 4, show that the dove–
hawk measure of  foreign policy prefer ences has a
moderate, but statistically significant, additive genetic
component. We also see that this measure does not appear
to have a significant common environmental component,
but does have a large unique environmental component.
Military spending, on the other hand, has an additive
genetic effect similar in magnitude to that of the dove–
hawk measure, but it is not statistically significant. The
only statistically significant variance component of mili-
tary spending is unique environment. These results offer
mixed support for our hypothesis: foreign policy prefer-
ences as measured by the dove–hawk continuum — the
measure closest to the theoretical construct of interest —
are significantly heritable, although we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no heritability for support for military
spend ing. The lack of significant heritability for military
spending may be due to its comparatively coarser metric
and the small sample of twins surveyed. Nonetheless,
because the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for support
for military spending, we discontinue its examination. 
Although we know of no behavioral genetic studies of
general foreign policy attitudes, Eaves et al. (1999) ana-
lyzed attitudes towards the military. Eaves et al. (1999)
constructed an index based on five items from the Wilson-
Patterson battery (Wilson & Patterson, 1968). The
inventory presents short phrases like death penalty and
asks whether subjects agree, disagree, or are uncertain with
the phrase. Their index was comprised of responses to
death penalty, military drill, the draft, pacifism, and
nuclear power. The authors found that 11% of the varia-
tion in these attitudes among males could be attributed to
additive genetic factors, compared with 4% among
females. Hatemi et al. (2010) reported higher heritability
estimates for the two items that are clearly associated with
the military, namely military drill (0.32 males and 0.41
females) and the draft (0.30 males and 0.38 females). Our
heritability estimate for the dove–hawk measure of foreign
policy preferences is similar to the two key military atti-
tudes studied by Hatemi et al. (2010). 
Our results for the seven-point scale of self-reported
political views are slightly higher than some previously
reported estimates for measures of political ideology. For
example, Truett, Eaves, Meyer, Heath, & Martin (1992)
and Alford et al. (2005) reported that approximately one-
third of the variation in political ideology could be
attributed to additive genetic factors. Eaves et al. (1999)
reported a higher heritability estimate for men (0.36) than
for women (0.20), a finding confirmed by Hatemi et al.
(2010) (0.58 versus 0.34). With the exception of the heri-
tability for females reported by Eaves et al. (1999), all of
the point estimates for the heritability of political ideology
lie within the 95% confidence interval for our estimate. 
It is also important to note that care is required when
comparing our results to previous work. Our study relies
on a different sample, both in terms of time and location,
as well as different measures of ideology and foreign
policy preferences. 
Bivariate ACE Model 
We now consider the hypothesis that the correlation
between foreign policy preferences and polit ical ideology
can be explained through correlated genetic liabilities. We
examine this possibility by performing a bivariate ACE
model with a Cholesky decomposition. This model parti-
tions the covariance between our ideology measure and
our dove–hawk measure of foreign policy preferences,
respectively, into additive genetic (A), common environ-
mental (C), and unique environmental (E) components.
TABLE 2
Phenotypic Correlations (Polychoric) and Cross-Twin Cross-Trait
Correlations (Polychoric) between Foreign Policy Preferences
Measures and Ideology
                                                     Dove–Hawk      Military spending      Ideology
Phenotypic (N = 551)
Dove–Hawk                                       1                                                        
Military spending                           0.454                         1                          
Ideology                                        0.453                     0.424                     1
Twin 1
MZ twin (N = 331)                              
Dove–Hawk                                0.355                     0.354                  0.385
Military spending                       0.263                     0.427                  0.333
Ideology                                     0.323                     0.253                  0.559
Twin 2
DZ twin (N = 220)
Dove–Hawk                                0.141                     0.137                  0.114
Military spending                       0.199                     0.256                  0.180
Ideology                                     0.131                     0.173                  0.290
Note: MZ = monozygotic; DZ = dizygotic. Italicized correlations are not signif-
icantly different from 0 at p < .05; all other correlations are significant
at p < .05.
TABLE 3
Fit Comparison of Alternative Specifications for Univariate Models for
Dove–Hawk, Military Spending, and Ideology
                                                                       –2LL                Δ–2LL             p (df)
ACE                                                            3,955.680                                      
Sex limitation ACE Dove–Hawk             3,955.951            0.271           0.965 (3)
ACE Military spending                               2,293.750                                      
Sex limitation ACE Military spending    2,295.826            2.076           0.557 (3)
ACE Ideology                                             3,604.135                                      
Sex limitation ACE Ideology                  3,604.813            0.678           0.878 (3)
Note: –2LL = –2.log-likelihood; Δ–2LL = difference in the –2 log-likelihood; 
df = degrees of freedom. 
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In other words, it allows us to quantify the degree to which
the same genes underlie both ideology and foreign policy
preferences. As in the univariate case, we estimate both the
sex limitation and pooled models and compare model fit.
In the sex limitation Cholesky model, separate standard-
ized path coefficients are estimated for both males and
females, and in the pooled model the path coefficients are
constrained to be equal across sex. In addition, because
the common environmental variance component was not
significant in the univariate model for the two measures
we are studying as part of the bivariate analysis, we esti-
mated a model constraining the common environmental
correlation in the pooled model to zero (an ACE rc = 0
model). The fit statistics associated with these models are
displayed in Table 5. Because both the full model and the
one in which rc = 0 fit better than the sex limitation
models, we do not display the sex limitation model results. 
The results for the full model shown in Table 6 are con-
sistent with the idea that ideology and foreign policy
preferences share the same genetic influence. The genetic
correlation between the dove–hawk measure and self-
reported ideology is .82, 95% CI [.56, 1.00]. The unshared
environmental correlation is .23 95% CI [.11, .34]. The
shared environmental correlation is not significantly
differ ent from zero. The covariance between ideology and
foreign policy preferences can be primarily explained by
additive genetic factors: 76% of the covariance between
self-reported ideology and foreign policy preferences can
be attributed to additive genetic factors. The results for the
model in which the shared environmental correlation is
constrained to be zero are very similar and the resulting
substantive conclusions are identical. 
Discussion 
This study has produced two findings. First, we have
shown that foreign policy preferences, as measured by a
dove–hawk continuum, are heritable. Second, we found
that the correlation between political ideology and
foreign policy preferences appear to be explained largely
by the same set of genes. In other words, the genes that
influence ideology may also explain foreign policy prefer-
ences. 
The idea that general foreign policy preferences are
heritable is novel to the study of said preferences.
Attention in analyses of the determinants of foreign
policy preferences has typically been focused on political
attitudes such as partisanship and ideology, and respon-
dent characteristics such as sex, race, education,
generation, and geographical location. This study con-
tributes to a growing literature that suggests many social,
behavioral, and political attitudes are influenced by
TABLE 4
Univariate ACE Models 
                                                    A                               C                               E
Dove–Hawk                               0.34                           0.00                          0.66
                                            [0.11, 0.44]                [0.00, 0.19]               [0.56, 0.76]
                                                                                                                       
Military spending                      0.37                           0.07                          0.57
                                            [0.00, 0.54]                [0.00, 0.38]               [0.46, 0.69]
                                                                                                                       
Ideology                                    0.56                           0.00                          0.44
                                            [0.27, 0.63]                [0.00, 0.25]               [0.37, 0.53]
Note: 95% confidence intervals for estimates of variance components for
additive genetic effects (A), common environmental effects (C), and
unique environmental effects (E) are shown below the estimate values.
TABLE 5
Fit Comparison of Alternative Specifications for Bivariate Models for
Ideology and Dove–Hawk
                                                             –2LL                   Δ–2LL                   p (df)
ACE Ideology                                   7,386.311                                               
Sex limitation ACE Ideology           7,389.051               2.741                0.974 (9)
ACE Ideology rc = 0                        7,389.066               0.015                0.903 (1)
Note: –2LL = –2.log-likelihood; _–2LL = difference in the –2log-likelihood; 
df = degrees of freedom.
TABLE 6
Bivariate ACE and ACE rc = 0 Estimates of Variance and Covariance Components for Ideology and Dove–Hawk
ACE Ideology model ACE rc = 0 Ideology model
                                                            VA                                VC                               VE                                              VA                                 VC                                VE
Ideology                                   0.54 [0.26, 0.65]          0.03 [0.00, 0.28]         0.43 [0.35, 0.51]                        0.54 [0.30, 0.65]            0.04 [0.00, 0.24]          0.42 [0.35, 0.51]
Dove–Hawk                              0.35 [0.10, 0.44]          0.00 [0.00, 0.21]         0.65 [0.56, 0.76]                        0.35 [0.15, 0.44]            0.00 [0.00, 0.17]          0.65 [0.56, 0.76]
                                                          CovA                           CovC                           CovE                                          CovA                                                                 CovE
Ideology–Dove-Hawk               0.76 [0.35, 0.96]        –0.01 [–0.15, 0.34]       0.25 [0.12, 0.40]                        0.74 [0.60, 0.87]                                               0.26 [0.13, 0.40]
                                                            rg                                 rc                                re                                               rg                                                                      re
Ideology–Dove-Hawk                .82 [0.56, 1.00]         –1.00 [–1.00, 1.00]        .23 [0.11, 0.34]                          .80 [0.63, 1.00]                                                 .23 [0.11, 0.34]
Note: VA, VC, VE = percent of variance [95% confidence interval] explained by additive genetic effects (heritability), common environment, and unique environ-
ment, respectively; CovA, Cov C, Cov E = covariances [95% confidence interval] between Ideology and Dove–Hawk explained by additive genetic effects,
common environment, and unique environment, respectively; rg, rc, re = [95% confidence interval] genetic correlation, common environmental correlation,
and unique environmental correlation, respectively.
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genetic differences. Yet the finding that foreign policy
preferences are heritable tells only part of the story. 
The robust finding in the literature that ideology has a
moderate association with individuals’ foreign policy
preferences (Holsti, 1992, 2004; Wittkopf, 1990, 1995),
coupled with the strong correlations between our mea-
sures of these two attitudes, suggest the same set of genes
may explain both variables. In other words, the pheno-
typic correlation between ideology and foreign policy
pref erences may be explained by correlated genetic liabil-
ities. This finding lays the groundwork for a more
detailed causal understanding of these phenomena.
Combining the intuition that liberal individuals are likely
to prefer cooperative foreign policies and that conserva-
tive individuals are likely to prefer militaristic foreign
policies with the results of the univariate ACE model,
which suggests that political ideology is also heritable,
signals that ideology may be the causal pathway through
which genes influence foreign policy attitudes. The results
from our bivariate ACE analysis are consistent with the
claim that ideology mediates this relationship. However, it
is important to point out that the Cholesky model is not a
mediation model and does not establish a causal relation-
ship. Genetic correlations may be interpreted as genes
influencing one trait that then influences a second trait.
Alternatively, genes may be influencing both traits in a
pleiotropic manner (Posthuma et al., 2003). For example,
it may be the case that genes are influencing ideology,
which in turn influences foreign policy preferences.
However, it may also be the case that these genes are
influencing ideology and foreign policy preferences inde-
pendently. We have not aimed to test these possibilities
here, but leave such work for future research. 
Our analysis does not indicate, however, that genetics
are the primary factor driving either foreign policy pref-
erences or ideology: variance in both measures of both
attitudes are generally dominated by unique environ-
mental factors, which account for more than half of the
variance in all attitudes under consideration. What our
analysis does suggest is that genetic differences are an
important factor that should be considered alongside the
more traditional predictors of foreign policy preferences. 
Further, it is interesting that common environmental
factors are rarely a significant part of the picture. Neither
of the outcome measures nor the ideology measure has a
statistically significant effect for common environment.
This is likely attributable to low demographic variance in
the sample: all twins were of a similar age from a similar
part of the country. A more diverse sample may produce
significant effects for common environmental factors. 
This study contributes to the synthesis of  two
approaches that have, until recently, remained distinct. A
growing body of research has been suggesting that a wide
variety of political and so cial attitudes and behaviors are
heritable. Recent findings have demonstrated heritable
variation in political ideology and several foreign-policy-
related attitudes (Alford et al., 2005; Eaves et al., 1999;
Hatemi et al., 2010; Truett et al., 1992). We have linked
these findings to the well-established finding that politi-
cal ideology is a major predictor of foreign policy
preferences. In so doing, we can suggest a more intricate
causal story for the realization of individual attitudes
towards foreign policy: ideology predicts foreign policy
preferences, but a moderate share of in dividual differ-
ences in both foreign policy preferences and ideology can
be explained by genetic variation. Furthermore, our
analysis suggests that a majority of the genetic variance
that accounts for individual differences in ideology is
shared with the genetic variance that accounts for indi-
vidual differences in foreign policy preferences. The
conclusions we draw from this set of results are that (a)
there are indeed genetic influences that account for
varying preferences in cooperative or militaristic foreign
policies, and (b) the same genetic influence operates on
ideology and foreign policy prefer ences. These results
raise the possibility that ideology is a mediating factor
between genetic factors and foreign policy preferences, a
possibility that future research using models tailored to
establish mediation and direction of causation effects
may examine. 
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